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Abstract
We analyze two-part tariﬀs in oligopoly, where each ﬁrm commits to a
certain quantity. The model is an extension of the one introduced in Har
(2001). We show that their main results are reversed when the model is
extended from one to two types of consumers. In particular, we ﬁnd that
price per unit can exceed marginal costs, and the ﬁxed fee can be below
costs. We also show that two-part tariﬀs may collapse, because each ﬁrm
would rather commit to a traditional Cournot price system (zero ﬁxed fee).
Finally, some numerical examples illustrate that both ﬁrms serving both
types of consumers can be an equilibrium outcome in duopoly in cases
where the monopolist would serve only one type of consumers.
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1 Introduction
Nonlinear prices are common in many industries, and have been studied ex-
tensively in the economic literature. However, most theoretical studies use a
monopoly setting. In contrast, we observe nonlinear prices not only in monopoly
markets, but also in other market settings such as oligopoly. The purpose of this
article is to help bridging this gap. We analyze two-part tariﬀs in a Cournot-like
setting by extending the seminal model of Har (2001).
Nonlinear pricing may not be sustainable in oligopoly. For example, Mandy
(1992) ﬁnds that in a traditional Bertrand oligopoly with homogeneous products
– where we allow the ﬁrms to set nonlinear prices – all prices may collapse to a
uniform price. The ﬁnding illustrates that, except for some special cases which
he explores, some of the assumptions in the traditional Bertrand model have to
be relaxed in order to make nonlinear prices sustainable in oligopoly. This has
been done in the emerging literature on nonlinear prices. One extension of the
traditional Bertrand model is to introduce product diﬀerentiation, see Calem and
Spulber (1984), Castelli and Leporelli (1993), Economides and Wildman (1995),
Shmanske (1991), and Young (1991). Another extension is to introduce capacity
constraints, as is done in Har (2001), Oren, Smith and Wilson (1983), Scotchmer
(1985a, 1985b) and Wilson (1993). Scotchmer (1985a, 1985b) only considers
existence when the number of ﬁrms becomes large, while both Oren et al. (1983)
and Wilson (1993) assume that the ﬁrms predict the market shares of their rivals.
In contrast, Har (2001) model quantity as a strategic variable and consider the
strategic interaction between a small (or a large) number of ﬁrms.
In Har (2001) each ﬁrm commits to a certain quantity, as is the case in a
traditional Cournot model. In addition, each ﬁrm sets its ﬁxed fee while the unit
prices are determined endogenously by market forces. The latter is analogous
to what is the case in a traditional Cournot model. In their paper, Harrison
and Kline also provide some examples where we do observe that ﬁxed fees are
less ﬂexible than prices per unit.1 It is found that in equilibrium price is set
equal to marginal costs, and the ﬁxed fee is positive for a given number of ﬁrms.
Furthermore, it is found that ﬁxed fees extract the entire consumer surplus if the
number of ﬁrms is suﬃciently small. Finally, they found that when the number
of ﬁrms approaches inﬁnity the ﬁxed fee tends toward zero.
We extend the model introduced in Har (2001) by assuming two instead of
one type of consumers. It turns out that none of the conclusions referred to
above is robust to such an extension of the model. If both types of consumers are
served, we ﬁnd that price per unit is above marginal costs. Furthermore, ﬁxed
fees can be zero or even negative for a ﬁnite number of ﬁrms. In fact, ﬁrms can
be better oﬀ committing to traditional Cournot competition where the ﬁrms can
1One example is a consumer club like Costco. The membership fee corresponds to a ﬁxed
fee and the price per product a member buy when he visits the store may vary considerably.
For more examples, see Har (2001).
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only charge a unit price. If the ﬁrms can choose whether to serve one or both
types of consumers, they may choose to serve only the large consumers. Then the
equilibrium outcome replicates the one shown in Har (2001), except there are now
some consumers that are not served. However, by using a numerical example we
show that there can be multiple equilibria. Moreover, it is shown that both ﬁrms
serving both types of consumers can be an equilibrium duopoly outcome in cases
where the monopolist would have preferred to serve only one type of consumers.
The driving force is that the rival, non-deviating ﬁrm supplies a given quantity
which it is committed to sell, acting as a constraint on the deviating ﬁrm’s price
setting.
The article is organized as follows. In Section 2 we formulate our model, and
report optimal pricing strategies given that all ﬁrms serve either both types of
consumers or only one type. In section 3 we explore the equilibrium outcomes of
the model. First, we consider the case with full market coverage, that is, both
ﬁrms are restricted to sell to both types of consumers. Second, we consider the
case where each ﬁrm chooses either to sell to one or both types of consumers.
Finally, in Section 4 we oﬀer some concluding remarks.
2 The Model
We consider a setup with k identical ﬁrms, k ≥ 2, supplying a homogeneous
product. The cost function is characterized by constant returns to scale, C (Q) =
cQ where c > 0 is the marginal cost and Q is output. For simplicity we omit
ﬁxed costs. The number of ﬁrms is exogenous and the question of entry is left
outside the scope of this paper.2
There are two groups of consumers with a total of N . Consumers with taste
parameter θ1 are in proportion λ and consumers with taste parameter θ2 are in
proportion (1− λ).3 Preferences are deﬁned by a quasi-linear utility function
V =
{
u (q, θ)− T if they pay T and consume q units
0 if they do not buy
,
θ = {θ1, θ2},
u (q, θ2) ≥ u (q, θ1) , ∀q.
(1)
The utility function is assumed to be increasing and strictly concave in q,
u (0, θ) = 0, limq→0 uq (q, θ) ≥ c, limq→∞ u (q, θ) ≤ 0. For any tariﬀ T = A +
pq, where A is a ﬁxed fee that is paid up-front and p is a unit price, utility
maximization yields a downward sloping demand curve for each individual which
is independent of income and therefore also of the ﬁxed fee. Indirect utility gross
2See Har (2001) on entry in this model.
3We refer to the ﬁrst group as type 1 consumers or low demand consumers and to the other
group as type 2 consumers or high demand consumers.
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of the ﬁxed fee is
q (p) ≡ q (p, θ) = maxq u (q, θ)− pq −A,
V (p, θ) = u (q (p) , θ)− pq (p) ,
V ′p = −q (p) ,
 = 1, 2.
(2)
With quasilinear utility we can measure the indirect utility in monetary terms.
Consumers choose to buy if they obtain a nonnegative net surplus at some ﬁrm
i, that is, iﬀ V (pi, θj)−A ≥ 0, i ∈ {1, 2, ..., k} and  = 1, 2. They buy from the
ﬁrm providing them with the highest surplus, V (pi, θ) − Ai ≥ V (pj, θ) − Aj ,
(i, j ∈ {1, 2, ..., k}, i = j,  = 1, 2). When the two consumer types are charged
the same tariﬀ, a type 2 consumer obtains a surplus that is at least as large as the
surplus a type 1 consumer obtains. Thus, if type 1 is able to obtain a nonnegative
surplus, type 2 obtains a strictly positive surplus.
Firms act to maximize proﬁt by choosing a strategy si = (Qi, Ai), with Qi > 0
for all i = 1, 2, . . . , k, and we assume that ﬁrms are able to commit to this
strategy. The ﬁrm cannot exclude any consumer from buying. In our model, we
use the assumption that for a given strategy combination there exists a consumer
equilibrium deﬁning a consumer-price proﬁle ((n1, . . . , nk), (p1, . . . , pk)). This is
formally deﬁned in Har (2001). Although we deﬁne a ﬁrm’s strategy in capacity
and the ﬁxed fee, from a consumer’s point of view he chooses the quantity that
maximizes his utility for a given Ai and pi. The notion behind this reasoning is
that it is a competitive equilibrium where a large number of consumers without
market power trade, given the ﬁxed fees and quantities from each ﬁrm. If all
ﬁrms leave each consumer with equal and nonnegative surplus, we assume that
all ﬁrms serve an equal share of each consumer type, ni = λN/k + (1− λ)N/k.
If there are at least two active ﬁrms, the relevant participation constraints in
ﬁrm i’s optimization problem are given by
V (pi, θ)− Ai ≥ V (pj, θ)− Aj ,  = 1, 2, j ∈ {1, 2..i− 1, i+ 1, ...k} . (3)
Proﬁt for ﬁrm i is given by
Πi = niAi + (pi − c)Qi. (4)
Since the ﬁxed fee is a lump sum transfer from consumers to the ﬁrm, the
unit price in ﬁrm i’s tariﬀ is adjusted in such a way that aggregate demand for
ﬁrm i’s product is equal to ﬁrm i’s supply. Hence, the unit price is independent
of the ﬁxed fee. Whenever the ﬁxed fee is positive, consumers will make all or
nothing purchases at ﬁrm i. When ﬁrm i serves a total of ni consumers, the unit
price is adjusted to satisfy the following market clearing condition
Qi = ni [λq1 (pi) + (1− λ) q2 (pi)] . (5)
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In line with Har (2001), let us assume that all ﬁrms charge the same ﬁxed fee
and the same unit price. Firm i maximizes proﬁt subject to the condition that
the unit prices charged by rival ﬁrms are adjusted to satisfy the market clearing
condition and subject to voluntary participation. When every other ﬁrm but i
serves both consumer types the unit price p charged by every other ﬁrm must
satisfy the condition
Q−i = (N − ni) [λq1 (p) + (1− λ) q2 (p)] ,
Q−i =
∑
j =iQj .
(6)
When rival ﬁrms charge their consumers according to the tariﬀ T = A + pq
consumer θ is indiﬀerent between buying from ﬁrm i and one of the other ﬁrms
when the participation constraint is binding. If the ﬁrm leaves the consumer with
additional surplus, it sacriﬁces proﬁt. We therefore expect
V (pi, θ)− Ai = V (p, θ)− A,  = 1, 2. (7)
Henceforth, superscript 12 denotes that both consumer types are served and
superscript 2 denotes that type 1 (the “small” type) is excluded. Let us ﬁrst
suppose that both consumer types are served. Then there is at least one addi-
tional active ﬁrm where both consumers buy a strictly positive quantity. When
the best alternative option for a type 1 consumer is represented by a tariﬀ T 12,
the relevant participation constraint is given by
V
(
p12i , θ1
)− A12i = V (p12, θ1)−A12. (8)
Taking rival ﬁrms’ tariﬀs as given and maximizing proﬁt with respect to p12i
give the following optimality condition for the unit price in a two-part tariﬀ
p12i = c+
(1− λ) [q2 − q1]
− [λq′1 + (1− λ) q′2]
,
q′ ≡
dq
dp
.
(9)
Next, ﬁrm imust choose the strategy (Q12i , A
12
i ) in such a way that p
12
i satisﬁes
the market clearing condition. To attract additional consumers from rival ﬁrms,
ﬁrm i has to adjust the ﬁxed fee. Hence, a marginal increase in market share
aﬀects ﬁrm i’s proﬁt via the ﬁxed fee. Finding the proﬁt maximizing strategy
reduces to ﬁnding the optimal number of consumers to serve.
The eﬀect on the ﬁrm’s proﬁt of a marginal increase in market share is
∂Π12i
∂ni
= A12 − p
12q1
ε (Q)
(
1
k − 1 − (1− λ)
q2 − q1
q1
)
. (10)
If all ﬁrms exclude type 1 and serve type 2 alone, the participation constraint
when the best alternative option for type 2 consumers is represented by a tariﬀ
T 2 becomes
V
(
p2i , θ2
)− A2i = V (p2, θ2)− A2. (11)
4
The optimal tariﬀ is a cost-plus-ﬁxed-fee tariﬀ and ﬁrm i chooses a strategy
(Q2i , A
2
i ) in such a way that the market clearing condition is satisﬁed when p
2 = c.
Again, applying symmetry, the eﬀect on the ﬁrm’s proﬁt of a marginal increase
in market share is
∂Π2i
∂ni
= (1− λ)
(
A12 − 1
k − 1
[
cq2 (c)
|ε (q2 (c))|
])
. (12)
Notice that if ﬁrm i takes the number of consumers it serves as given, for
any tariﬀ charged by rival ﬁrms the reservation utility is deﬁned as a constant
and will not aﬀect the optimization with respect to unit price. The problem then
resembles the monopoly problem, and the marginal price in our model is identical
to that in a monopoly.
The following two Lemmas state the pricing strategies in a k-ﬁrm oligopoly,
given that they either serve both types or exclude type 1.
Lemma 1 (Two consumer types) (i) Let us assume that both consumer types
are served by all ﬁrms. Then the pricing strategy in two-part tariﬀs in a k-ﬁrm
oligopoly is given by
A12i ≡ A12TT = min
{
V (p12, θ1),
p12q1
ε(Q12)
(
1
k−1 − (1− λ) q2−q1q1
)}
p12i ≡ p12TT = c+
(1− λ) [q2 − q1]
− (λq′1 + (1− λ) q′2)
Q12i ≡ Q12TT =
N
k
(λq1 + (1− λ) q2)
(q = q (p
12
TT ) , q
′
 = q
′
 (p
12
TT ) ,  = 1, 2)
(13)
(ii) If both consumer types are served, the pricing strategy in a traditional Cournot
game is given by
A12i ≡ A12UP = 0
p12i ≡ p12UP ≥ c
Q12i ≡ Q12UP =
N
k
(λq1 + (1− λ) q2)
(q = q (p
12
UP ) , q
′
 = q
′
 (p
12
UP ) ,  = 1, 2)
(14)
where p12UP is the (standard) price when both types are served in a Cournot game
with k identical ﬁrms charging a uniform price.
Lemma 2 (Harrison and Kline) If one of the consumer types is excluded
from purchasing, the pricing strategy in two-part tariﬀs in a k-ﬁrm oligopoly
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is given by
A2i ≡ A2TT = A = min
{
V (c, θ),
cq
(k − 1) |ε (q)|
}
p2i ≡ p2TT = c
Q2i ≡ Q2 =
N
k
λq
λ = λ if  = 1, λ = (1− λ) if  = 2,
(q = q (c) ,  = 1 or 2)
(15)
with θ2 ≥ θ1 type 2 will always be served.
Lemma 2 is the result in Har (2001) when the tariﬀs are symmetric. Lemma
1 is the extension of this to the two-type case, and the proof is given by the
previous calculations. According to Lemma 2 the ﬁxed fee in the single-type case
converges toward zero as the number of ﬁrms approaches inﬁnity. Moreover, note
that the price per unit is set equal to marginal costs in the case with one type.
As Lemma 1 indicates, these results are reversed when we extend the model from
one to two types.
Har (2001) give a thorough treatment of Cournot competition with two-part
tariﬀs and a single consumer type, and they also guide the reader through all
proofs in that case. They show that the pricing described in Lemma 2 is a
unique Nash equilibrium in pricing strategies for the game. All k ﬁrms produce.
In addition to the equilibrium with symmetric market, shares there also exist
equilibria that are asymmetric in market shares.
In what follows, we consider ﬁrst the ﬁrms’ pricing in a symmetric equilibrium
when all consumers are served. Next, since low demand types may be excluded
we consider the prospects for a unique equilibrium with symmetric pricing in a
duopoly with respect to market coverage.
3 Equilibrium outcomes
To illustrate the equilibrium outcomes, we have chosen to focus on a case where
consumer preferences are represented by a quadratic utility function. We let the
reservation utility be zero for both consumers. V = θq− 12q2−T ,  = 1, 2, if they
pay T and consume q units, otherwise they obtain zero utility. Each consumer has
a linear demand function q = θ− p,  = 1, 2. Letting θ ≡ λθ1 + (1− λ) θ2 ≥ θ1,
expected demand is λq1 + (1− λ) q2 = θ − p. The indirect utility exclusive of
the ﬁxed fee for a consumer paying a unit price of p is V (p, θ) =
1
2
(θ − p)2,
 = 1, 2. Because we are interested in how equilibrium strategies are aﬀected by
heterogeneity in demand, the example is somewhat simpliﬁed by letting θ1 = 1
and c = 1
2
. Increased demand side heterogeneity is captured by variations in λ
and θ2. Large heterogeneity can then come about either by an increase in the
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number of type 2 consumers (λ decreases), or because a type 2 consumer has
larger willingness to pay relative to a type 1 consumer (θ2 increases). Hence,
increased demand side heterogeneity is captured by an increase in θ. We use
Lemmas 1 and 2 to characterize the equilibrium in terms of pricing and expected
proﬁt per consumer. All these computations are given in the appendix.
3.1 Market coverage
Let us ﬁrst consider the case where both types are served by all ﬁrms.4 This
could be due to some institutional restrictions, forcing them to provide a universal
service. Given such a restriction, which combination of ﬁxed fee and price per
unit would each ﬁrm choose?
Proposition 1 Let us assume that both types of consumers are served and each
ﬁrm sets a two-part tariﬀ. If (i) 0 ≤ λ ≤ λ∗ ≡ 4θ2−5
4θ2−4 , or (ii) k > k
∗ ≡ 1
2(θ2−1)(1−λ) ,
then A12TT < 0 and p
12 = λ + (1− λ)θ2 − 12 ≡ p12TT > c. Otherwise, A12TT > 0 and
p12 = p12TT > c.
The critical values λ∗ and k∗ are derived in the appendix. First, we see that
each ﬁrm would set a price per unit that exceeds marginal costs. In contrast, Har
(2001) found that each ﬁrm would set a price per unit equal to marginal costs.
Obviously, the extension of the model – from one to two types of consumers
– explains the change in the result. It is well known from a monopoly model
that a ﬁrm that serves two types of consumers with one two-part tariﬀ should
let the unit price exceed marginal costs, see Oi (1971). By doing so it is able
to extract more proﬁts from the high demand consumer, and this outweighs the
loss in proﬁt extraction from the low demand consumer as long as the price-cost
margin is not above a certain threshold level. The price-cost margin is higher the
larger the diﬀerence between the consumer types (θ1versus θ2), and the larger the
proportion of the high demand consumers (λ approaches zero). This is natural,
since a large diﬀerence between those two groups of consumers would lead to a
relatively high price-cost margin to extract proﬁts from the larger group.
Second, note that the price-cost margin is not inﬂuenced by the number of
ﬁrms. At ﬁrst glance, this may come as a surprise. Why do they not compete
on prices? The reason is that they compete on access prices, not prices per unit.
The prices per unit are set to balance the revenues from the two consumer groups,
after they have competed on ﬁxed fees to attract consumers. Note that our result
is in line with the result in Har (2001), where the price per unit is always equal
to marginal costs since the unit price in both cases just replicates the monopoly
price.
4In the next section we show that this can be the equilibrium outcome for a large number
of parameter values.
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Third, we see that each ﬁrm’s ﬁxed fee can be set below the ﬁxed cost of
serving a consumer (which is normalized to zero in our setting). In contrast,
Har (2001) found that the ﬁxed fee is always above costs, but approaches costs
when the number of ﬁrms approaches inﬁnity. In their setting, as well as in ours,
proﬁts approach zero when the number of ﬁrms approaches inﬁnity. But the fact
that we have a positive price-cost margin, implies that the ﬁxed fee is competed
away even for a ﬁnite number of ﬁrms. In fact, if the demand side heterogeneity
is suﬃciently large, the ﬁxed fee is competed away even in a duopoly.
Obviously, the existence of many ﬁrms would lead to ﬁerce competition on
ﬁxed fees. But even with two ﬁrms, ﬁxed fees can be negative if the fraction
of the high type consumer is large or when the diﬀerence in consumers’ type is
large. In such a case the price per unit is high, to extract proﬁts from the “large”
consumer. Then the ﬁxed fee is low even in a monopoly setting, and competed
away in a duopoly setting.
An interpretation of a negative ﬁxed fee in our model is that the ﬁxed fee is
positive, but below costs. This is what we observe in some cases. In Norway for
example, mobile phones have been sold at a price of NOK 1 each, while some
retailers have received a payment of approximately NOK 2000 from the producer.
The producer then incurs a loss of approximately NOK 2000 for each consumer
it captures, and earns revenues on the same consumer from what he pays for the
use of the mobile phone.5 What is labelled loss leaders in the grocery sector can
be interpreted in a similar way. Grocery stores advertise low prices on certain
products in order to attract consumers to the store, and the consumers end up
buying both the advertised product as well as other products. It has been shown
that the grocery store should then set a price below costs on the advertised
products, and a high price-cost margin on other products (see Lal and Matutes
(1994)).
In some instances, however, access can be cost free (or close to cost free),
for instance joining some kind of club as the examples referred to in Har (2001).
Hence, an obvious question is whether the ﬁrm would have been better oﬀ con-
straining its tariﬀ policy to uniform pricing. What, then, if the ﬁrm sets a ﬁxed
fee equal to zero rather than a negative ﬁxed fee? It can then be shown that the
following would emerge as equilibrium outcomes
Proposition 2 Let us assume that both types of consumers are served and each
ﬁrm can choose either to set a two-part tariﬀ or a uniform price (ﬁxed fee equal to
zero). Then each ﬁrm chooses a uniform price if the ﬁxed fee in a two-part tariﬀ
would be negative (see the previous Proposition), where p12UP < p
12
TT . Otherwise,
it chooses a two-part tariﬀ with A12TT > 0 and p
12
UP > p
12
TT .
5Strictly speaking, the tariﬀ structure is more complicated than the one with a ﬁxed fee and
a price per unit. The user pays a ﬁxed fee in addition to a monthly ﬁxed fee and a price per
unit. Then the ﬁxed fee is followed by a two-part tariﬀ, not a uniform price as in our model.
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First, we see that as long as the ﬁxed fee is above costs in a setting with a
two-part tariﬀ, the ﬁrm would set a two-part tariﬀ rather than restrict its pricing
policy to a uniform price. A uniform price, which equals the traditional Cournot
price, would in that case be higher than the unit price in a two-part tariﬀ. This
suggests that a ﬁrm would ﬁnd it proﬁtable to deviate from an outcome where
both ﬁrms set a uniform price. It could deviate by setting a lower price per unit,
and extract the gross consumer surplus it generates through a positive ﬁxed fee.
Therefore, we would expect that the ﬁrms would end up with a two-part tariﬀ
with a positive ﬁxed fee.
Second, we see that each ﬁrm would choose a uniform price if the alternative
is that both ﬁrms set a two-part tariﬀ with a negative ﬁxed fee. To understand
this, note that in such a case the price per unit in a two-part tariﬀ is higher than
the traditional Cournot price (a uniform price). In our model, the ﬁrms compete
in utility levels. Then if other ﬁrms hold a high unit price and generate consumer
surplus via a negative ﬁxed fee, it will be proﬁtable to match other ﬁrms’ oﬀer by
restricting the ﬁxed fee to zero and lowering the price per unit, thereby increasing
consumer surplus.
Note that competition between the ﬁrms leads to a low price per unit: The
equilibrium outcome is a uniform (Cournot) price if that price per unit is lower
than the price per unit in a two-part tariﬀ, and vice versa. This is illustrated in
Figure 1, where the solid lines show the price per unit in equilibrium.
Unit price
Number of ﬁrms
Cournot price
Two-part tariﬀ
Unit cost
Figure 1: Price per unit in equilibrium.
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As explained above, in some instances the institutional setting is such that
the ﬁrms are forced to set a ﬁxed fee. In other instances, though, ﬁrms are
more ﬂexible. If the choice is either to set a negative ﬁxed fee and a relative
high price per unit or a low uniform price, each ﬁrm may end up choosing the
latter price system because that would generate a larger sale and thereby a larger
proﬁt. This suggests that there is no conﬂict between public policy and private
incentives concerning the choice of tariﬀ structure. Each ﬁrm has incentive to
choose the tariﬀ structure with the lowest price per unit, which is beneﬁcial for
consumers and leads to only a limited dead weight loss.
3.2 Market coverage versus exclusivity
In the previous section, we assumed that each ﬁrm served both types of con-
sumers. This may not be the equilibrium outcome. As is well known from
monopoly, in some cases it is beneﬁcial for a ﬁrm to exclude the type with low
willingness to pay and in other cases it is preferable to serve both types of con-
sumers. Would the same be true in oligopoly? It turns out to be hard to obtain
closed form solutions when we assess the ﬁrm’s incentive to deviate from an equi-
librium with symmetric tariﬀs and market shares. That is, to decide whether the
case where type 1 is served or excluded, respectively, is a stable equilibrium or
not. We have therefore chosen to present some numerical examples to illustrate
possible equilibrium outcomes.
To simplify, let us consider duopoly. Consider the two equilibrium candidates
in pure strategies where the ﬁrms announce identical tariﬀs and serve the same
customer base. In the ﬁrst equilibrium candidate, both consumer types are served
with a tariﬀ (A12TT , p
12
TT ) and each ﬁrm earns a proﬁt per consumer π
12
TT . In the
second equilibrium candidate, low demand consumers are excluded from making
purchases and type 2 is served with a tariﬀ (A2TT , c). Each ﬁrm earns a proﬁt per
consumer π2TT . For now we assume that the ﬁrms have equal market shares, i.e.,
na = nb =
1
2
N . Expected proﬁt in each of the two possible equilibrium outcomes
is
Π12TT =
N
2
π12TT (16)
and
Π2TT =
N
2
(1− λ) π2TT . (17)
If demand side heterogeneity is not too large, a duopoly is able to extract all
surplus from type 1 when both consumer types are served. They would generate
the same proﬁt in each of the symmetric cases when Π12TT = Π
2
TT , i.e., if
λ ≡ λ∗∗ = 1
2
+
3−4θ2+
q
(4θ22−3)(4θ22−8θ2+5)
8(θ2−1)2 (18)
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Since the duopoly extracts all surplus from type 1 provided that λ ≥ (2θ2 −√
(2)− 1)/(2θ2− 1) (which is smaller than λ∗∗), λ∗∗ is also the monopolist cutoﬀ
value: If λ < λ∗∗ it serves only type 2 consumers, while if λ > λ∗∗ it serves both
types of consumers.
Let us use λ∗∗ as a reference point for our numerical examples. If λ < λ∗∗,
demand side heterogeneity is large and we conjecture that the ﬁrms would tend
to exclude type 1. Conversely, we conjecture that each ﬁrm would tend to serve
both types of consumers if λ > λ∗∗. Note, however, that it is not at all obvious
that the cutoﬀ point is the same in duopoly as in monopoly. A monopoly can
exclude type 1 consumers by designing a tariﬀ they would never accept, while
this is not possible in a duopoly. To ﬁnd the Nash equilibrium, we check for
unilateral deviations from each of those two possible equilibrium candidates, for
diﬀerent values of λ. Then we can compare the equilibrium outcome in duopoly
with the equilibrium outcome in monopoly.
First, let us consider the equilibrium candidate where both ﬁrms serve only
type 2 and the ﬁrms’ tariﬀs are given by (A2TT , c). Type 1 is excluded and the
ﬁrms extract the entire surplus from type 2 via the ﬁxed fee, and A2TT = V (c, θ2).
The two ﬁrms split the base of type 2 consumers equally, na = nb = (1− λ)N/2.
Would a unilateral deviation from an outcome where both ﬁrms serve only
type 2 be proﬁtable? One ﬁrm, say ﬁrm a, could deviate by setting a tariﬀ that
type 1 is just willing to accept and capture all type 1 consumers, λN . However,
since low demand consumers derive nonnegative surplus, high demand consumers
will derive strictly positive surplus by switching to low demand types’ tariﬀ. The
deviating ﬁrm will then serve a mix of type 1 and type 2 consumers, it will serve
all type 1 consumers and more than half of all type 2. Since ﬁrm a captures some
of the high demand types as well, this tends to make such a deviation proﬁtable.
Let the deviating ﬁrm choose a strategy (Q˜12TT , A˜
12
TT ), or equivalently charge a
tariﬀ (A˜12TT , p˜
12
TT ) in order to maximize proﬁt subject to individual rationality and
ﬁrm b’s strategy (Q2TT , A
2
TT ). The problem is to maximize
Π˜12TT |Π2TT = [N − n¯b] A˜12TT+ (19)(
p˜12TT − c
)
[Nλq˜1 + (N (1− λ)− nb) q˜2]
subject to
V (p˜12TT , 1) ≥ A˜12TT (20)
V
(
p˜12TT , θ2
)− V (p˜12TT , 1) = V (p¯2TT , θ2)− V (c, θ2) (21)
N
2
(1− λ) q2 ≥ n¯bq¯2 (22)
where q˜i = qi (p˜
12
TT ) ,  = 1, 2, q¯2 = q2 (p¯
2
TT ), and q2 = q2 (c). Firm b, the non-
deviating ﬁrm, will then lose type 2 consumers. This leads to a price reduction
at ﬁrm b in order to restore individual rationality, the unit price falls to p¯2TT < c.
Since a unit price reduction in turn leads to an increase in a type 2 consumer’s
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demand, q2(p¯
2
TT ) > q2(c), the capacity supplied by ﬁrm b becomes insuﬃcient to
serve all type 2 consumers, and n¯b < (1 − λ)N/2 is adjusted to restore market
clearing at ﬁrm b. Formally, the individual rationality constraint (21) and the
market clearing condition (22) jointly determine ﬁrm b’s share of type 2 consumers
as a function of ﬁrm a’s strategy, n¯b = n¯b(p¯2(p˜
12
TT )).
Although ﬁrm a obtains lower proﬁt per consumer when it deviates, it expands
its market. When λ is low or θ2 is high, the market expansion eﬀect is less
likely to cover the per-consumer-loss in proﬁt. In that case there are few type 1
consumers to serve and expected proﬁt per consumer is signiﬁcantly lower when
ﬁrm a deviates. Conversely, we expect that a deviation is proﬁtable when demand
side heterogeneity is low. For λ close to λ∗∗ the expected revenue per consumer
is identical and we therefore conjecture that it is proﬁtable to deviate.
In Table 1 we have reported some numerical examples for N = 100 and
c = 1
2
. Hence, p2TT =
1
2
and A2TT = V (c, θ2). The results in Table 1 conﬁrm
our conjecture. Note that when λ < λ∗∗, the monopolist would serve only type
2 consumers. This particular case therefore suggests that a Nash equilibrium in
a duopoly where both ﬁrms serve only one type of consumers to a large extent
coincides with the case where a monopolist prefers to serve only one type of
consumers.
Table 1: Deviation from a symmetric equilibrium where type 1 is excluded.
θ2 λ λ
∗∗ p˜12TT A˜
12
TT p¯
2
TT n¯b n¯b/ [N (1− λ)] Π2TT Π˜12TT
1.2 .2 .467 .618 .073 .374 33.9 .42 9.8 8.9
1.2 .4 .467 .580 .088 .365 25.1 .42 7.4 9.7
1.2 .47 .467 .568 .093 .362 22.1 .42 6.5 10.0
1.2 .8 .467 .522 .114 .351 8.2 .41 2.5 11.5
1.5 .4 .732 .714 .041 .261 24.2 .40 15.0 11.6
1.5 .7 .732 .597 .081 .214 11.7 .39 7.5 11.5
1.5 .74 .732 .583 .087 .209 10.1 .39 6.5 11.6
1.5 .9 .732 .531 .110 .189 3.8 .38 2.5 12.1
2 .4 .883 .927 .003 .156 24.4 .41 33.8 17.8
2 .7 .883 .699 .045 .037 11.5 .38 16.9 13.0
2 .8 .883 .630 .068 .003 7.5 .38 11.3 12.4
2 .9 .883 .564 .095 0 3.7 .37 5.6 12.3
3 .8 .959 .762 .028 0 7.5 .37 31.3 15.0
3 .92 .959 .603 .079 0 2.9 .36 12.5 12.7
3 .97 .959 .593 .107 0 1.1 .36 4.7 12.4
Second, let us consider the equilibrium candidate where both ﬁrms serve both
types of consumers, where the ﬁrms’ tariﬀs are given by (A12TT , p
12
TT ) (> (0, c)).
Then type 2 enjoys positive surplus, and type 1 receives his reservation utility.
Again, assume that the ﬁrms have equal market shares so that they each serve
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N/2. Consider, again, a unilateral deviation by ﬁrm a, and keep the strategy for
ﬁrm b ﬁxed (Q12TT , A
12
TT ).
In this case ﬁrm a can deviate by using one of two strategies. Firm a can aim
for all type two consumers N(1 − λ), but leave them a positive surplus, hence
setting A˜2TT < V (c, θ2). Or, knowing that ﬁrm b has a limited capacity, ﬁrm a
could act as a monopoly on any residual demand. He will then serve less than
the pool of type 2 consumers N(1− λ) but extract all surplus A˜2TT = V (c, θ2).
Consider the ﬁrst strategy. Firm a announces a tariﬀ (A˜2TT , c) that is strictly
preferred by type 2 consumers. It will extract as much as possible from type 2
consumers via the ﬁxed fee and will maximize
Π˜2TT |Π12TT = N (1− λ) A˜2TT (23)
subject to
V (c, θ2)− A˜2TT ≥ V
(
p¯12TT , θ2
)− A12TT (24)
N
2
(λq1 + (1− λ) q2) ≥ Nλq¯1 (25)
where qi = qi (p
12
TT ), or qi = qi (p
12
UP ) if A
12
TT = 0, (  = 1, 2), and q¯1 = q1 (p¯
12
TT ).
The unit price p¯12TT is adjusted to account for the fact that ﬁrm b is now left with
only type 1 consumers instead of a mix of type 1 and type 2. Given that type 1
consumers receive exactly their reservation utility, the unit price that clears the
market at ﬁrm b cannot exceed p12TT , (instead, type 1 consumers are rationed at
ﬁrm b). Hence, 0 < p¯12TT < min{p12TT , p12UP}. This restricts the ﬁxed fee in (24),
which in turn will restrict the proﬁtability earned on type 2 consumers.
From (23) it would seem that a deviation is proﬁtable when λ is small. How-
ever, when λ is small, p¯12TT is low as well in order to restore market clearing at ﬁrm
b. Hence, A˜2TT is also low in this case. The more intensely ﬁrms compete, either
via a low ﬁxed fee or a low unit price, the more binding is the restriction on A˜2TT .
This suggests that in duopoly an outcome where both ﬁrms serve both types of
consumers can be an equilibrium outcome in situations where a monopolist would
have preferred to serve only one type of consumers. In our numerical example,
the second eﬀect always dominates the ﬁrst and a deviation is never proﬁtable.
In Table 2 we have reported some numerical examples, again using N = 100, and
c = 1
2
, hence p12TT > c, A
12
TT = V (p
12
TT , 1).
The other possible deviation strategy in this situation was for ﬁrm a to act
as a monopoly on any residual demand from type 2. This time, consider a
deviation where ﬁrm a announces a tariﬀ that extracts all surplus from type 2,
(V (c, θ2) , c). Type 2 enjoys positive surplus by switching to ﬁrm b’s tariﬀ. Hence,
type 2 consumers will crowd out type 1 consumers at ﬁrm b since capacity at ﬁrm
1 is insuﬃcient to meet all demand. Firm a earns monopoly proﬁt on each type
2 consumer it serves and aggregate proﬁt is given by
Π˜2TT |Π12TT = [N (1− λ)− n¯b]V (c, θ2) (26)
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Table 2: Deviation from a symmetric equilibrium (Q12TT , A
12
TT ), the ﬁxed fee in type
2’s tariﬀ is restricted.
θ2 λ λ
∗∗ p12TT A
12
TT p˜
2
TT A˜
2
TT V (c, θ2) p¯
12
TT Π
12
TT Π˜
2
TT
1.2 .2 .467 .66 .058 .5 -.417 .245 0 6.9 -33.4
1.2 .4 .467 .62 .072 .5 -.023 .245 .38 6.6 -1.4
1.2 .47 .467 .61 .078 .5 .055 .245 .47 6.5 2.9
1.2 .8 .467 .54 .106 .5 .133 .245 .54 6.3 2.7
1.5 .4 .732 .8 .020 .5 -.183 .5 .38 7.1 -11.0
1.5 .7 .732 .65 .061 .5 .194 .5 .64 6.8 5.8
1.5 .74 .732 .63 .069 .5 .190 .5 .63 6.7 4.9
1.5 .9 .732 .55 .101 .5 .150 .5 .55 6.3 1.5
2 .7 .883 .8 .020 .5 .154 1.125 .64 7.1 4.6
2 .8 .883 .7 .045 .5 .309 1.125 .69 7.3 6.2
2 .9 .883 .60 .080 .5 .225 1.125 .60 6.5 2.3
3 .8 .959 .9 .005 .5 .301 3.125 .69 9.0 6.0
3 .92 .959 .66 .058 .5 .445 3.125 .66 6.9 3.6
3 .97 .959 .56 .097 .5 .245 3.125 .56 6.3 0.7
where n¯b is the number of type 2 consumers that can be served by ﬁrm b. Type 2
is indiﬀerent between the two ﬁrms’ tariﬀs when he receives zero surplus. Hence,
the unit price in ﬁrm b’s tariﬀ must be adjusted in order to restore individual
rationality for type 2, p¯2TT .
V
(
p¯2TT , θ2
)− A12TT ≥ 0 (27)
N
2
(λq1 + (1− λ) q2) ≥ n¯bq¯2 (28)
N (1− λ) ≥ n¯b (29)
This time, ﬁrm b is left with type 2 consumers only, instead of with a mix of
type 1 and type 2. Again, we would have thought it is proﬁtable to deviate when
λ is small. But now, when λ is small, the ﬁxed fee A12TT is low. And therefore,
type 2 consumers will gain considerably if they switch to ﬁrm b. Hence, the unit
price p¯2TT is high and demand from type 2 is restricted. This means that q¯
2
TT is
low and that n¯b is large in order to restore market clearing.
In Table 3 we report some numerical examples, still using N = 100 and c = 1
2
.
As shown, we ﬁnd no examples where such a deviation is proﬁtable. Again, the
fact that the non-deviating ﬁrm has committed itself to sell a certain quantity
acts as a constraint on the deviating ﬁrm’s behaviour. If there are few type 2
consumers, the non-deviating ﬁrm would serve them all and the deviating ﬁrm
would have no residual demand. If there are many type 2 consumers, the price
per unit would be close to marginal costs. If so, there is a limited scope for the
deviating ﬁrm to generate additional consumer surplus from type 2 by setting
price per unit equal to marginal costs.
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Table 3: Deviation from a symmetric equilibrium (Q12TT , A
12
TT ), acting as a
monopoly on the residual demand from type 2.
θ2 λ λ
∗∗ p12TT A
12
TT p¯
2
TT Aˆ
2
TT n¯b N (1− λ) Π12TT Πˆ2TT
1.005 .02 .196 .505 .123 .510 .128 50 98 6.25 6.1
1.05 .17 .168 .542 .105 .592 .151 55 83 6.29 4.3
1.1 .3 .292 .570 .093 .670 .180 58 70 6.37 2.1
1.2 .2 .467 .660 .058 .860 .245 74 80 6.89 1.6
1.2 .4 .467 .620 .072 .820 .245 60 60 6.61 0
1.2 .47 .467 .606 .078 .806 .245 53 53 6.53 0
1.2 .8 .467 .540 .106 .740 .245 20 20 6.29 0
1.5 .4 .732 .800 .020 1.3 .500 60 60 8.5 0
1.5 .7 .732 .650 .061 1.15 .500 30 30 6.81 0
1.5 .74 .732 .630 .069 1.13 .500 26 26 6.67 0
1.5 .9 .732 .550 .101 1.05 .500 10 10 6.31 0
2 .7 .883 .800 .020 1.80 1.125 30 30 8.5 0
2 .8 .883 .700 .045 1.70 1.125 20 20 7.25 0
2 .9 .883 .600 .080 1.60 1.125 10 10 6.5 0
3 .8 .959 .900 .005 2.90 3.125 20 20 10.25 0
3 .92 .959 .660 .058 2.66 3.125 8 8 6.89 0
3 .97 .959 .560 .097 2.56 3.125 3 3 6.34 0
4 Concluding remarks
Har (2001) have shown how we can extend the traditional Cournot model to a
setting with not only a unit price, but also a ﬁxed fee. They found that each
ﬁrm sets a price per unit equal to marginal costs, and a positive ﬁxed fee that
approaches zero when the number of ﬁrms becomes large. Thus, we extend their
model from one to two types of consumers. It turns out that the conclusions in
Har (2001) are not robust to such an extension. Let us assume that both types
are served. We then ﬁnd that price per unit exceeds marginal costs and the ﬁxed
fee can be negative. If the ﬁrms can choose between a traditional Cournot pricing
(a uniform price) and a two-part tariﬀ, they may choose a uniform price.
We have also explored the case where the ﬁrms can choose whether to serve
both types of consumers or only one type. It turns out that this case is diﬃcult to
solve analytically. We have therefore chosen to illustrate the possible equilibrium
outcomes with numerical examples. The examples suggest that there might be
multiple Nash equilibria. First, both ﬁrms serving only one type of consumers can
be an equilibrium outcome. The numerical examples suggest that this equilibrium
outcome to a large extent coincides with the cases where the monopolist chooses
to serve only one type of consumers. Second, we ﬁnd that both ﬁrms serving
both types of consumers can be an equilibrium outcome for a large number of
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parameter values. In fact, we ﬁnd no examples where the ﬁrms would deviate
from such an outcome. The intuition is that the rival, non-deviating ﬁrm’s given
quantity acts as a constraint on the deviating ﬁrm’s behavior. Although this is
just a numerical example, it illustrates that there are instances where a duopoly
serves both types of consumers while the monopoly would prefer to serve only
one type.
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Appendix
Calculation of pricing and profit
In the following we derive the ﬁrms’ pricing in the case when they announce
identical tariﬀs, as given in Lemma 1 and Lemma 2. Superscript 12 is used
when both types are served (superscript 2 when type 1 is excluded) and k is an
argument used to describe the number of active ﬁrms.
A.1 Both consumers are served
Pricing is given by Lemma 1. With two active ﬁrms we have
A12 (2) =


1
8
(3− 2θ)2 1 ≤ θ < 1
2
(√
2 + 1
)
5
4
− θ 1
2
(√
2 + 1
) ≤ θ < 5
4
0 θ ≥ 5
4
(30)
p12 (2) =
{
θ − 1
2
1 ≤ θ < 5
4
1
3
(θ + 1) θ ≥ 5
4
(31)
π12 (2) =


1
8
+ 1
2
(θ − 1)2 1 ≤ θ < 1
2
(√
2 + 1
)
1
2
(
3
2
− θ) 1
2
(√
2 + 1
) ≤ θ < 5
4
1
18
(2θ − 1)2 θ ≥ 5
4
(32)
With three active ﬁrms we have
A12 (3) =
{
1
4
(
7
2
− 3θ) 1 ≤ θ < 7
6
0 θ ≥ 7
6
(33)
p12 (3) =
{
θ − 1
2
1 ≤ θ < 7
6
1
4
θ + 3
8
θ ≥ 7
6
(34)
π12 (3) =
{
3
8
− 1
4
θ 1 ≤ θ < 7
6
3
64
(2θ − 1)2 θ ≥ 7
6
(35)
With more than three ﬁrms we have
A12 (k) =


1− 2k (θ − 1)
4 (k − 1) 3 < k <
1
2(θ−1)
0 k ≥ 1
2(θ−1)
(36)
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p12 (k) =


θ − 1
2
3 < k < 1
2(θ−1)
2θ + k
2 (k + 1)
k ≥ 1
2(θ−1)
(37)
π12 (k) =


3− 2θ
4 (k − 1) 3 < k <
1
2(θ−1)
k
(2θ − 1)2
4 (k + 1)2
k ≥ 1
2(θ−1)
(38)
In Proposition 1 the critical value λ∗ solves the inequality 5
4
− λ− (1− λ)θ2 ≤ 0
from (30). k∗ solves the inequality 1−2k(λ+(1−λ)θ2−1)
4(k−1) ≤ 0 from (36).
A.2 Only type 2 is served
Pricing is given by Lemma 2. The unit price is always equal to marginal price,
p2(2) = p2(3) = c, and the ﬁrms’ proﬁt per consumer is whatever they manage
to capture via the ﬁxed fee A2(k). With less than 3 active ﬁrms we have
A2 (2) = π2 (2) = A2 (3) = π2 (3) = 1
8
(2θ2 − 1)2 (39)
With more than 3 ﬁrms we have
A2 (k) = π2 (k) =
(2θ2 − 1)2
4 (k − 1) (40)
A.3 Uniform Cournot price
When both types are served in a k-ﬁrm oligopoly and all ﬁrms charge a uniform
price, we have
p12UP (k) =
2θ + k
2(k + 1)
(41)
and
π12UP (k) = k
(2θ − 1)2
4(k + 1)2
(42)
Proposition 2 can be veriﬁed by comparing the ﬁrms’ proﬁt in the two relevant
cases. When A12TT is negative π
12(k) (from (37)) is equal to or greater than π12UP (k)
(from (42)).
The monopolist’s cut-oﬀ rate λ∗∗ solves the equality π12(2) = π2(2) in (32) and
(39) respectively, given that the duopoly extracts all surplus from type 1 when
both types are served.
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